e persistence of racial inequality in the U.S. labor market against a general backdrop of formal equality of opportunity is a troubling phenomenon that has signi cant rami cations on the design of hiring policies. In this paper, we show that current group disparate outcomes may be immovable even when hiring decisions are bound by an input-output notion of "individual fairness." Instead, we construct a dynamic reputational model of the labor market that illustrates the reinforcing nature of asymmetric outcomes resulting from groups' divergent access to resources and as a result, investment choices. To address these disparities, we adopt a dual labor market composed of a Temporary Labor Market (TLM), in which rms' hiring strategies are constrained to ensure statistical parity of workers granted entry into the pipeline, and a Permanent Labor Market (PLM), in which rms hire top performers as desired. Individual worker reputations produce externalities for their group; the corresponding feedback loop raises the collective reputation of the initially disadvantaged group via a TLM fairness intervention that need not be permanent. We show that such a restriction on hiring practices induces an equilibrium that, under particular market conditions, Pareto-dominates those arising from strategies that employ statistical discrimination or a "group-blind" criterion. e enduring nature of equilibria that are both inequitable and Pareto suboptimal suggests that fairness interventions beyond procedural checks of hiring decisions will be of critical importance in a world where machines play a greater role in the employment process.
INTRODUCTION
As algorithms are increasingly deployed to make social decisions that have previously been under the sole purview of humans, a growing body of work has challenged the reigning primacy of optimality and e ciency when issues of bias and discrimination are potentially at stake. Research in the growing eld of algorithmic fairness has sought to address these concerns about the machine decision-making process by examining and manipulating standard tasks such as ranking or classi cation under generalized constraints of "fairness. " Such computational notions of fairness have been varied but two broad opposing perspectives have proposed solutions that either defend fairness at the individual level (similar individuals are treated similarly) [1] or at the group level (groups are awarded proportional representation) [2, 3] . While this paper similarly adopts a constraint-based intervention to achieve fairness, we depart from standard accounts of fairness that consider static domain-general algorithms and instead develop a dynamic model for the speci c domain of decision-making in the labor market. Our work considers the role that rms' hiring practices play in perpetuating economic inequalities between social groups by way of the disparate outcomes that groups experience in their employment opportunities and wage prospects. We address the issue by building upon a dynamic model of worker and rm behavior that has been shown to generate the asymmetric group outcomes that are observed empirically between black and white workers in the United States [9] [10] [11] and appending a constraint on rms' hiring practices that successfully induces a group-equitable equilibrium.
As we focus on the particular domain of labor market dynamics, our paper draws upon an extensive literature in economics. e theory of statistical discrimination, originally set forth in two seminal papers by Phelps [4] and Arrow [5] , explains disparate group outcomes as the result of rational agent behaviors that lock a system into an unfavorable equilibrium. In the basic model, workers compete for a skilled job with wage w. Skill acquisition requires workers to expend an investment cost of c, which is distributed according to a function F . A worker's investment decision is an assessment of her expected wage gain compared with her investment cost. Firms seek information about a worker's hidden ability level but can only base hiring decisions on observable a ributes: her noisy investment signal and group membership. e rm's response to this missing information problem is to update its beliefs about a worker's quali cations by drawing on its prior for her group's ability levels. erefore if a rm holds di erent priors for di erent groups, it will also set di erent group-speci c hiring thresholds. Further, since these distinct thresholds are observed and internalized by workers, they adjust their own investment strategies accordinglyindividuals within the unfavored group will lower their investment levels, and individuals in the favored group will continue to invest at a high level. Notably, even when the distribution of investment costs F is the same for each group 1 , an asymmetric equilibrium can arise in which groups invest at di erent levels, further informing rms' distinct priors and reinforcing disparate employment prospects. In other words, rational workers and rms best respond in ways that exactly con rm the others' beliefs and strategies, and thus, the discriminatory outcome is "justi ed. "
A proponent of "individual fairness" may diagnose the problem of statistical discrimination as a failure to treat candidates of 1 is has been the standard assumption in the economics literature since Arrow [5] . arXiv:1712.00064v1 [cs.GT] 30 Nov 2017 similar investments similarly 2 . A er all, the mistaken inference of unequal group ability levels indeed appears to be the origin of rms' inequitable hiring decisions. Moreover, when investment level is positively correlated with likelihood of being quali ed, hiring based solely on investments is both rational and individually-fair. However, this group-blind solution fails to take into account a critical aspect of workers' investments-namely that they are choices rather than givens. Failure to recognize the upstream causes of observed data features brings to light the prickly notion of "ground truth" that has, from the start, plagued work on machine learning bias. Within a system as complex as the labor market, an input-output account of fairness that assesses the mapping of workers' investment levels to their hiring outcomes does not resolve the underlying source of inequalities that drives the di erences in a ributes between groups. Because both statistical discrimination and machine learning rely on data that harbor historical inequalities, local fairness checks are o en incapable of addressing the self-perpetuating nature of biases. Even without group biases, the paradox remains: the cyclic equilibrium ensures local procedural fairness-fairness with respect to investment choices-while maintaining global disparate outcomes. e di culty in pinpointing a particular cause of observed systemwide asymmetric outcomes challenges our mission in designing constraints to ensure fairness within the domain. If the outcomes themselves are trapped in a feedback loop, a successful fairness constraint should rst jolt the system out of its current steady-state, and second, launch it on a path towards a preferable equilibrium. As such, a successful approach must consider fairness in situ. is paper presents a domain-speci c dynamic model with an intervention that e ects system-wide impact, guaranteeing a group-equitable equilibrium that is stable and self-sustaining.
In our model, workers invest in human capital, enter rst a Temporary Labor Market (TLM), and then transition into a Permanent Labor Market (PLM) 3 . We use this partition to impose a constraint on TLM hiring practices that enforces group statistical parity representation. However, the restriction need not apply in the PLM where rms select natural best response hiring strategies. Our employment model is reputational-a worker carries an individual reputation, which is a summary of her past job performances and belongs to a group with a collective reputation, which is a measure of the proportion of its members producing "good" outcomes. Working within this model, we show that by imposing this constraint on rms' hiring strategies in the TLM, the resulting steadystate in the PLM is symmetric such that an equal proportion of workers in the two groups produce good outcomes and are thus hired. e labor market at equilibrium, both procedurally and in outcomes, satis es leading notions of "fairness"-group, individual, meritocratic [1, 3? ]-discussed in the algorithmic fairness literature. Furthermore, we show that under particular labor market 2 In the exposition of "individual fairness" proposed by Dwork et al. [1] , the built-in exibility of the generic similarity metric between persons can include group membership and even be used to justify "fair a rmative action. " However, within an economic signaling environment where rms' hiring standards a ect workers' investments, a more exible metric approach that compares quality within and across groups still fails to account for the strategy and incentive features of the labor market and thus the group coordination failure that characterizes many statistical discrimination equilibria. 3 Worker movement in a segmented market is common in the labor economics literature. Of these, our work is most similar to Kim & Loury [6] , but notably they speci cally model the e ects of statistical discrimination, while ours explicitly requires groupequitable outcomes. conditions, it Pareto-dominates the asymmetric outcomes that arise under two unconstrained rational hiring strategies: group-blind hiring and statistical discriminatory hiring. Our fairness intervention exploits the complementary nature of individual and collective reputations such that the system produces its own feedback loop that incrementally addresses initial inequalities in group social standing. As such, the TLM intervention need not be permanent-statistical parity of hired workers becomes the natural result of rms' optimal hiring strategies once group equality is restored and the fairness constraint becomes obsolete. is paper's constraint-based approach to achieving group-equitable outcomes in a reputational model of labor market interactions melds the perspectives and techniques of labor economics with the motivations of algorithmic fairness. However, our system-wide view also challenges a thread of work in the literature that characterizes notions of fairness as input-output-based properties of a decisionmaking function. By casting workers and rms as strategic agents in a dynamic game, we incorporate complexities of the labor market dynamic such as agents' expectations, incentives, and externalities that are otherwise di cult to encapsulate in a static classi cation se ing. We advocate for an intervention that addresses the root of disparities between black and white workers' positions in the labor market and society-not only positions of unequal prospects and outcomes but as important, positions of unequal opportunities and, as a result, quali cations. Ensuring procedural fairness in the hiring decision alone is insu cient for this greater task. Our proposed constraint is designed to perturb a labor market at asymmetric equilibrium by co-opting the system's own cyclic e ects to install group-equality that is self-sustaining in the long-term.
In Section 2, we present a standard model of labor market dynamics and introduce our fairness intervention. Section 3 contains an overview of the equilibria results of the constrained-hiring model along with a comparison against equilibria arising from two rational hiring strategies free from such a constraint. e paper ends with a re ection on the equilibrium tendencies of discrimination and their implications on the design of fairness constraints. We also o er some comments on the dynamic feedback e ects that are inherent features of persistent inequalities and the challenges they issue upon future work in algorithmic fairness.
Related Work
Within the algorithmic fairness literature, Zemel et al. [7] address group and individual notions of fairness by constructing a mapping of agent data to an intermediate layer of clusters that each preserve statistical parity while obfuscating protected a ributes. A second map taking cluster assignments to their nal classi cations then allows "similar" agents to be treated similarly. is dual-map approach roughly corresponds to the roles of the TLM and PLM in our model. Related work has sought distance metrics to guide the initial mapping [1] , but since criteria for similarity vary by domain, general approaches o en face obstacles of application. Our paper's concentrated treatment of labor market dynamics aims to addresses this concern. We answer a call by Friedler et al. [8] to specify a particular world view of fairness within a domain and classi cation task. Our model starts with an assumption of inherent equality between groups. As such, di erences in observable investment , , decisions or job outcomes are due to unequal societal standing, producing secondary e ects of inequality, rather than fundamental di erences in the nature of the individuals.
Labor market discrimination has been of long-standing interest in economics due to the persistent inequalities in employment prospects among groups of di erent race, gender, and other sociallysalient a ributes [9] [10] [11] . Since most forms of explicit wage-discrimination are now illegal in the U.S. and genetic accounts of group di erences have been largely discredited [12] , modern theories of labor market discrimination have updated the classical works-Becker's "tastebased" discrimination [13] and Phelps' model of exogenous group productivity di erences [4] -by examining the social sources of asymmetric outcomes. Research in the eld has produced models that consider temporal dynamics, incorporate distinct group cost functions, and allow wages to develop endogenously [14, 15] . We follow in this line of work by incorporating a dynamic group reputation parameter into an individual's cost function, a modeling choice informed by the vast empirical literature showing the di erential externalities produced by groups of di erential social standing. But our model is not the rst that makes explicit this linkage. In research examining the impact of neighborhood segregation on agents' access to resources for skill acquisition, Bowles, Loury, and Sethi [16] utilized a group "skill share" metric that functions similarly to our notion of group reputation in its e ect on individuals' costs.
is paper also frames the hiring process as reputational in nature, following a distinct literature on collective reputation [17, 18] . Of these, our work shares most in common with the model proposed by Levin [19] , in which workers carry an individual reputation that contributes to their group's reputation. Levin shows that even when cost conditions evolve stochastically, reputations can produce a persistent feedback e ect that leads to convergence to an asymmetric equilibrium in which groups occupy distinct social standings. Unlike in Levin, the notion of collective reputation in our model bears not only on workers' forward-looking expectations and incentives but also explicitly impacts future generations' investment costs. Additionally, since our work has in mind the information-processing capabilities of arti cial intelligence agents, we formalize the concept of "individual reputation" as composed of a total history of previous outcomes. ese additional "data," while potentially overwhelming for human decision-makers, can be handled by an algorithmic decision-maker. Since the functionality of machine learning in the hiring process is ultimately based in a form of "rational" statistical discrimination of worker data and job histories, this strand of economics literature is particularly relevant for considerations of algorithmic fairness in the labor market.
MODEL
We highlight the role of the fairness constraint within the rest of the standard labor market dynamics of the model by utilizing a dual labor market setup with a Temporary Labor Market (TLM) and a Permanent Labor Market (PLM). In the former, a hiring constraint is established to ensure statistical parity, and in the la er, rms hire according to their best response hiring practices in a reputational model applied to the particular se ing of employment.
is partition does li le to impinge upon the standard dynamics of the labor market-workers ow from the TLM to the PLM, wages are labor-market-wide, and individual worker reputations in the PLM produce externalities for the collective group reputations that play a key role in individuals' pre-TLM investment decisions.
General Setup
Consider a society of n workers who pass through the labor market sequentially at times t = 0, 1, .... e labor markets maintain a constant relative size: m proportion of the workers reside in the TLM, and 1−m reside in the PLM. Movement is governed by Poisson processes-workers immediately replace departing ones in the TLM, transition from the TLM to the PLM according to the parameter κ, and leave the PLM at rate λ.
Each worker belongs to one of two groups µ ∈ {B,W } with population share σ B and 1 − σ B respectively. We assume that these subpopulation proportions of workers are stable such that a worker of group µ who leaves the labor market is replaced via the birth of a new worker of the same group. e distribution of individual abilities, described by the CDF F (θ ), is stable over time and identical across groups. In contrast, societal reputation varies with time and by group. A group's time t reputation π µ t gives the proportion of all individuals in group µ who are producing "good" outcomes in the labor market, over the interval timespan [t − τ , t], where the parameter τ ≥ 0 controls the time-lag e ect of a group's previous generations' performance on its present reputation.
Prior to entering the labor market, workers select education investment levels η, weighing the cost of investment with its expected reward. Firms hire and pay workers based on expected performance, awarding wage w( t ) for a "good" worker, where t gives the proportion of "good" workers in the PLM at time t. is is formalized by assigning workers to either skilled or unskilled tasks with distinct wages. us for simplicity, workers who do not pass particular hiring thresholds may also be considered "hired, " but they are assigned to an unskilled task and paid a wage normalized to 0. e wage premium w( t ) is decreasing in t , since as the relative supply of "good" workers increases, imperfect worker substitutability lowers their marginal productivity, thus decreasing wage. We impose a minimum wagew such that lim t →∞ w( t ) =w and a maximum wagew such that lim t →0 w( t ) =w. In the context of the model, minimum and maximum wages should not be considered as only products of labor laws, rather they also act to track the supply of "good" workers relative to rms' demand.
Temporary Labor Market
A worker i of group µ chooses to invest in human capital η i ≥ 0 according to her expected wage gain of being in the skilled labor market w( t ) 4 and her personal cost function for investment, c π µ t (θ i , η i ), which is a function decreasing in her individual ability θ i 5 and increasing in her selected level of investment η i . e incorporation of group reputation π µ into an individual's cost function re ects the di erential externalities produced by groups of di erential social standing [16] . We posit that a worker belonging to a group with a superior societal reputation has improved cost conditions relative to her counterparts with equal ability in the lower reputation group. Formally, ∀π
. Investment in human capital operates as an imperfect signal, and workers have a hidden true type: quali ed or unquali ed, ρ ∈ {Q, U }. Let γ : R ≥0 → [0, 1] be a monotonically increasing function that maps a worker's investment level to her probability of being quali ed. Unlike in Spence's original work on education signaling [20] in which investment confers no productivity bene ts and thus operates purely as a signal to employers, in our model, a a worker's chosen investment level η has intrinsic value insofar as it is positively correlated with her likelihood of being quali ed γ (η).
Given this setup, a rm's TLM hiring strategy is a mapping H T : R ≥0 µ → {0, 1} such that the hiring decision for worker i is based only her observed investment level η i ∈ R ≥0 and group membership µ. A worker who is hired into the TLM enters the pipeline and is eligible to compete for a PLM skilled job; a worker who does not pass the TLM hiring stage remains in the market but is permanently excluded from candidacy for the skilled wage. For the purposes of this paper, we will mainly consider only those workers who successfully enter the skilled hiring pipeline, considering all others as "not hired. " As such, we use the terms "skilled" and "hired" interchangeably.
Permanent Labor Market
Labor market dynamics follow in the style of repeated principalagent interactions with hidden actions (e ort exertion) but observable histories (reputation of outcomes). Once hired into the TLM, a worker i exerts on-the-job e ort-choosing either high (H ) or low (L) e ort-which stochastically produces an observable good (G) or bad (B) outcome that impacts her individual reputation and thus future reward. Exerting L is free, but exerting H is not, with cost e ρ (θ i ), which is a function of quali cation status ρ ∈ {Q, U } and worker ability level θ i . E ort is more costly for unquali ed individuals, and thus ∀θ i , e U (θ i ) > e Q (θ i ). We emphasize here that the notions of ability level θ and quali cation status ρ are distinct worker qualities. A high ability worker is one who has the general a ributes that bear on success in the realms of education and work, whereas a quali ed worker is one who has the appropriate training and skills for a given job. We may say, very crudely, that a worker is "born" with an ability level, while a worker "earns" a quali cation status. In our model, a worker's ability level precedes her investment decision, which begets a quali cation status. High e ort increases the probability of a good outcome G. If p ρ,k gives the probability of achieving outcome G with quali cations ρ and e ort level k, then the following inequalities hold.
Since the e ect of quali cations on exerting high e ort is already incorporated in its cost, p Q, H = p U , H , and we write both quantities as p H . We then simplify p Q, L and p U , L to p Q and p U respectively.
We emphasize the distinction between the e ort exertion cost functions e(·) here and the previous investment cost functions c(·)the former are pertinent to workers already in the labor market and di er by quali cation status, whereas the la er relate to pre-labormarket decisions and di er by group membership. Separate cost functions allow for a ner analysis of the salient factors that in uence agent behavior at distinct points of the labor market pipeline. e inclusion of group membership into human-capital investment costs re ects the genuine di erences in resources available to workers of di erent groups in their paths to education a ainment 6 .
A worker keeps the same TLM job until the Poisson process with parameter κ selects her to move into the PLM, where at each time step, she cycles through jobs, exerting a chosen e ort level, producing an observable outcome, and accumulating a history of past performances that includes her TLM outcome. At each time step, rms in the PLM want to hire all and only those workers who consistently exert e ort. To do so, rms distill a worker's history of observable outcomes into her "individual reputation" Π t i , which gives the proportion of outcomes G in her length-t history. In a labor market system of repeated worker-rm contracting, rms have the power to use these visible individual reputations to set self-enforcing relational contracts. A rm's PLM hiring strategy is a mapping H P : [0, 1] → {0, 1} such that the decision is solely a function of Π t i . Figure 1 depicts a timeline of how workers move through the labor market pipeline and interact with rms.
While "fairness" is an inevitably thorny ethical concept to de ne, this paper's goal of achieving long-term fairness is equivalent to a aining group equality in labor market outcomes. Since groups do not di er in fundamental or intrinsic ways, their job and wage prospects should also not systematically diverge at steady-state.
RESULTS
Reputation-based labor market models, such as the one described in this paper, can generate asymmetric group outcomes when rms utilize rational strategies such as statistical discrimination or groupblind hiring [5, 14, 15, 21] . Since this paper examines the e ect of our proposed intervention on system-wide dynamics and outcomes, in the following section, we consider only those strategies and equilibria outcomes that arise in this fairness-constrained se ing.
Equilibrium Strategies and Steady-States
We start by describing TLM strategies resulting from the fairness constraint, then move onto the PLM and analyze rms' and workers' best response strategies together. Gameplay in the PLM mirrors repeated principal-agent interactions wherein rms have the power 6 It is important to highlight that we do not claim that group membership ceases to be a relevant factor impacting agent behavior once workers are in the labor market, but we note that a worker's quali cations, or the extent to which her skill investment proved to be successful, becomes an overriding determinant. Insofar as education investment bears on quali cation status, it is clear that a worker's group membership continues to impact her labor market outcomes. , , proportion of group µ workers producing good outcomes at time t η investment level p H , p Q , p U probability of producing G given e ort level c π µ t (θ, η) cost of investment γ (η) probability of being quali ed ρ ∈ {Q, U } hidden quali cation status e ρ (θ )
cost of e ort exertion Π t i individual reputation at time t to enforce contracts by monitoring individual reputations, and thus we consider strategies that constitute a sequential equilibrium.
Since a TLM rm prefers candidates who are more likely to be quali ed, optimal hiring follows a threshold strategy: Given a hiring thresholdη, ∀i such that η i ≥η, H T (i) = 1, and inversely, ∀i such that η i <η, H T (i) = 0. However, since rms must abide by the statistical parity hiring rule, their optimal threshold strategy is uniquely determined: if a rm aims to hire a fraction of all workers, its investment thresholds will be implicitly de ned and group-speci c, so that in the TLM, skilled employees from groups µ and ν will constitute σ µ and (1 − σ µ ) proportions of the full worker population respectively.
A worker of group µ, observing her group-speci c TLM investment threshold η µ , will weigh her cost of investment with her expected wage gain w( t −1 ). All workers i with c π µ t (θ i , η µ ) ≤ w( t −1 ) will choose to invest exactly at the level η i = η µ and be hired for the skilled position in the TLM; all other workers will invest at level η i = 0 and fail to enter the pipeline for competing for the skilled job. Workers who pass the rst hiring stage know that their future PLM opportunities will depend on their observable outcome in the TLM, and as such they exert e ort in a one-shot game. A worker i with quali cation status ρ exerts high e ort on the job if and only if e ρ (θ i ) ≤ w( t −1 )(p H − p ρ ).
As previously shown, while the statistical parity constraint preserves the fundamental equality of ability distributions F (θ ) between groups, the group-speci c investment thresholds η µ generate group-speci c investment strategies. As consequence, since investment has positive returns on quali cation status, groups may have di ering proportions of quali ed candidates in the PLM pool. We denote by γ µ t the proportion of candidates in group µ who are quali ed at time t, leaving 1 − γ µ t who are unquali ed. en the proportion of group µ workers in the TLM who produce good outcomes follows the recursive model
It is important to note that µ t gives the proportion of workers in the skilled labor market who at time t are producing good outcomes in their jobs. is quantity does not exactly coincide with group reputation, π µ t , which gives a (time-interval average) normalized metric that scales with the proportion of all members in group µ-including those who are not granted entry into the skilled job pipeline-who are producing good outcomes.
A PLM worker's future-anticipatory strategy is a selection of time, reputation, wage, and hiring threshold-dependent probabilities of e ort exertion ϵ(Π t i ) with Π t i ∈ {Π t } where the index i of Π t i denotes a particular individual reputation level in the set of all possible time t reputation levels {Π}. Supposing that workers engage in N -depth reasoning where N t, this quantity may be computed via backward induction on the continuation value for a given individual reputation, V (Π t i ). With this setup, the continuation value V (Π N ) = 0, and the agent with ability θ and quali cation ρ solves the following dynamic programming problem
and ∀t, w( t ) = w( t ) when agent looks forward from time t where the worker solves for optimal e ort exertion probabilities ϵ(Π t i ) for each possible reputation Π t i ∈ {Π t i }, and high e ort is only optimal at time t if V (Π t i , G)(p H − p ρ ) ≥ e ρ (θ ). If rms wish to hire all and only those workers who consistently exert high e ort, their equilibrium strategy is to select a reputation thresholdΠ t = p H − ∆ t when facing a worker with history length t, where ∆ t > 0 acts as the rm's optimistic forgiveness bu er, permi ing a worker's reputation to be slightly under the p H threshold, to ensure that it does not penalize workers who exert high e ort but are unlucky and receive B outcomes. An optimal choice of ∆ t monotonically decreases in t toward 0 as the reputation of a worker consistently exerting high e ort converges to p H as t → ∞. Note that the rm must also take care not to decrease ∆ t too slowly, lest workers are able to exert low e ort and continue to be hired. us the rm optimizes its hiring thresholdΠ t = p H − ∆ t by decreasing ∆ just enough at each time step to motivate consistent high e ort from workers who can a ord it. All other workers exert low e ort in each round. us given a rm's reputation thresholdΠ t , its equilibrium PLM hiring strategy H P is a mapping such that if and only if Π t t ≥Π t , H P (Π t i ) = 1, and the worker is hired, else H P (Π t i ) = 0, and the worker does not earn the wage premium. We summarize this strategy in the following Proposition and defer the interested reader to the Appendix for its proof. (ii) A worker's e ort strategy E is a selection of e ort levels that considers only the wage premium w( t −1 ) and cost of exertion such that E(w( t −1 )) = H if and only if e ρ (θ ) ≤ w( t −1 )(p H − p ρ ), otherwise E(w( t −1 )) = L.
Interestingly, the strategies employed in the repeated workerrm interactions in the PLM generate a recursive relationship of the proportion of "good" workers for each group that mirrors the structure of (1). PLM rms' stringent threshold reputation hiring strategy imposes the same type of "pressure" on workers at each round of employment as does the single-shot game in the TLM. In both labor markets, every outcome "counts. "
Having elaborated upon the dynamics of both the TLM and PLM, we incorporate worker movement and combine the results to obtain a recursive relationship that governs the sequence of workers' performance results from an initial wage w 0 . Note that the multiplicity of possible rm hiring strategies produces a multiplicity of dynamic paths of outcomes {( µ t , ν t )} ∞ 0 to steady-state, but given that in our model, rms are willing to hire only and all workers who consistently exert high e ort, rm and worker equilibrium strategies are as described in Proposition 1, there is a unique sequence of group outcome pairs ( µ t , ν t ) such that there exists a time t = T with the property that ∀t ≥ T , (
T 3.1. Under the described labor market conditions in which proportion of workers gain entry into the TLM and rms abide by the statistical parity hiring constraint, the proportion of all workers in group µ producing good outcomes at time t, µ t in the full labor market follows the recursive system
where ϕ and η µ in Eq. 3 are monotonically increasing functions whose composition combines the labor market's reputational feedback e ect with rms' TLM constrained group-investment thresholds. en there exists a unique stable symmetric steady-state equilibrium and convergence time T , whereinπ µ t =π ν t =π , ∀t > T , satisfying system-wide fairness, with a corresponding unique stable wagew.
To understand why the existence of this unique stable symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed when TLM rms are bound to the statistical parity requirement, consider the two variables that a ect a group µ worker i's likelihood of producing a good outcome: her ability level θ i and her probability of being quali ed P(Q |η µ ) = γ µ . Since there are positive returns to investment, γ µ is increasing in π µ : As her group µ social standing rises, cost conditions improve, and as a result, workers in future generations are more likely to be quali ed. With the imposition of the TLM hiring constraint, rms recognize the groups' di erent costs of investment and hire in a manner that retains equality between the two groups' underlying ability distributions F (θ ) within the labor market, which assures that the proportions of workers producing good outcomes in each group µ do not diverge within the skilled labor market pipeline. Moreover, the statistical parity hiring constraint requires that rms hire in a manner such that workers from a disadvantaged group µ are not inequitably blocked from entering the skilled labor market and always constitute σ µ of the TLM. As a result of maintaining both identical ability distributions F (θ ) and proportional representation σ µ in the TLM, statistical parity hiring ensures that as group outcomes in the skilled labor market converge, so do group reputations.
us, the γ t -generated positive feedback loop that pushes towards diverging group outcomes is always constrained, allowing the natural reputational feedback on group investment cost functions c µ to drive the convergence of group outcomes and thus group reputations to a single steady-state value. Importantly, throughout the path of {( µ t , ν t )} outcomes toward this symmetric steady-state, the "severity" of the TLM fairness constraint on rms' hiring strategies continually slackens until it recedes into disuse. For a full exposition of the proof, see the Appendix.
Under statistical parity hiring in the TLM, groups with unequal initial social standing will gradually approach the same reputation level according to time-lag τ . e constraint has the e ect of coopting the "self-con rming" loop for group reputation improvementcollective reputation produces a positive externality, lowering individual group members' cost functions, thus improving investment conditions for future workers, further raising individual and group reputation. We point out that the empirically-validated link between group reputations and members' investment costs makes a TLM statistical parity constraint a more e cient means of addressing group inequalities than a similar intervention in the PLM. Since the TLM represents the entry point into the market, enforcing statistical parity at the onset ensures that lower reputation workers are not disproportionately excluded from the pipeline as a whole.
We next compare this steady-state under the TLM hiring constraint with long-term outcomes of other rational hiring strategies that are not bound by any notions of fairness and show that under particular labor market conditions, the fairness steady-state is Pareto-dominant.
Comparative Statics with Unconstrained Hiring Strategies
In the absence of any constraint, rms are free to select any strategy that will maximize their probability of employing high-ability, quali ed workers. Two such common strategies are group-blind, sometimes called "meritocratic, " and statistical discriminatory hiring. We provide an overview of each practice and then continue on to comparing their long-term equilibria outcomes with the symmetric steady-state that arises under our TLM hiring constraint. Consider a group-blind TLM hiring strategy that is individualbased, operating under an equal-treatment philosophy. Without considering agent group membership, here let us suppose µ ∈ {B,W }, the rm hires a proportion of workers by selecting a single investment level thresholdη for all workers, implicitly de ned as
where σ B and 1 − σ B give the proportion of individuals in groups B and W respectively, and the function c π µ (·) determines the group µ investment level. Pragmatically under this strategy, the rm will , , examine the broad distribution of all investment levels and select a threshold above which it is willing to employ workers. Moreover, this strategy is rationalized by the fact that the thresholdη maximizes the expected number of hired workers who are quali ed. An alternative class of rm hiring strategies employ statistical discrimination, in which priors regarding a worker's observable a ributes, such as group membership, are used to infer a particular individual's hidden a ributes. In particular, if TLM rms hold priors ξ B and ξ W about the two groups' capabilities, upon observing an applicant's group µ and investment level η, they will update their beliefs of the prospective employee's quali cations according to:
where p Q (η) and p U (η) give the probability of a quali ed and unquali ed worker having investment level η respectively.
In a PLM with unsaturated demand (w =w) for skilled workers, the TLM constraint leads to a symmetric steady-state equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the asymmetric equilibria that arise under group-blind and statistical discriminatory hiring.
We present an abbreviated exposition of the underlying factors that drive unconstrained hiring strategies to Pareto-dominated outcomes. For the full account of the proof, see the Appendix.
Group-blind hiring satis es neither of the two key constrained hiring guarantees described in the proof explanation for eorem 3.1-namely, groups no longer share equal ability distributions F (θ ) nor are they proportionally represented in the market according to their demographic shares σ µ . e violation of both of these criteria contribute to group reputation divergence and thus the existence of persistent asymmetric outcomes between groups.
At the asymmetric steady-state, groups retain distinct investment costs that, under a group-blind investment threshold, generate group-speci c ability level thresholds θ B and θ W . If group reputation π B < π W , then these ability thresholds may be ranked with respect to the thresholdθ that arises under the fairness constraint: θ W <θ < θ B . ese hiring strategies inequitably bound the proportion of able and quali ed workers in group B who are eligible to compete for skilled jobs, leaving behind an untapped source of group B individuals who would have otherwise been hired. Under PLM conditions in which demand for skilled workers is unsaturated and the wage w( t ) =w, workers in group W who are barred from entering the labor market in the proposed fair regime are not hired at equilibrium under group-blind hiring anyway. With strictly be er-o employment outcomes for group B workers and no worse outcomes for group W workers, the constrained-hiring equilibrium Pareto-dominates the group-blind hiring equilibrium.
Similarly, statistical discriminatory hiring leads to group-speci c ability thresholds and does not guarantee statistical parity. As Coate and Loury [21] show, self-con rming asymmetric equilibria also exist under this regime, wherein lower investment levels within the group with lower social standing are justi ed by rms' more stringent hiring standards. ese e ects have consequences that mirror the Pareto-dominated results under group-blind hiring.
DISCUSSION
Describing disparate outcomes in employment as caused by rational agent best response strategies suggests that the eld of algorithmic fairness should consider the labor market's inherent dynamic setting in its approach to potential interventions. Fairness constraints that are conceived as isolated procedural checks have a limited capacity to install system-wide fairness that is self-sustaining and long-lasting. e problem of fairness in the labor market is fundamentally tied to historical factors. Within nearly all societal domains in which fairness is an issue, past and current social relations di erentially impact subjects, producing distinct sets of resources, options, and opportunities that continue to mark agents' choices and outcomes today. Empirical evidence points to what economist and social theorist Glenn Loury has called "development bias, " in which black members of society have reduced chances of realizing their potential, as the greater source of racial inequality in welfare outcomes than discriminatory hiring [? ] . is perspective challenges the notion that assuring "individual fairness" of the actual procedure of hiring should be the primary concern in assuring a labor market that is unbiased as a whole.
Not only is the standard learning theory formulation of the problem, in which agent a ributes are treated as a priori givens, inadequate to a end to development bias, it also neglects the (arguably) meritocratic goals of the labor market. In economic se ings, rewarding merit primarily serves an instrumental purpose-to incentivize future investment and e ort-rather than existing simply to pass along desert-based rewards to candidates. Framing the problem as one of clustering or classi cation fails to understand the labor market as an incentive-oriented system. Fairness constraints that solely assess an algorithm's treatment of workers' quali cations similarly fall into the trap of viewing hiring decisions only as rewards to meritorious individuals without considering the incentive purposes of the reward system at-large.
In contrast, a dynamic model recognizes the ripple e ect of development bias in the past and calls for a fairness intervention with incentive features that carries momentum into the future. e labor market as a source of economic opportunity is an ideal se ing for a notion of fairness that is oriented toward a future beyond the short timeline of rm hiring cycles. It is precisely our focus on steadystate outcomes that allows for this long-term conception of fairness. However, it should be noted that the employment outcomes along the path to the symmetric equilibrium are by no means guaranteed to satisfy any notions of fairness, neither individual nor group. But we claim that conceiving of fairness in this way-as a project that aims to achieve permanent societal group-egalitarianism-is an ambition that is not only a worthy goal in itself but also one that we show may be economically socially optimal.
Our model of individual reputations as a sequence of previous outcomes in the PLM ts within the hiring regime today, in which employers have increased access to worker data. Since algorithms will be largely responsible for making sense of this historical data, future work should consider how systems that si through a worker's history should be designed to determine when group membership-related considerations, such as the ones embedded in the TLM constraint proposed here, should be taken into account. As machine decision-makers are deployed increasingly throughout hiring processes, we must grapple with a long tradition of explicit and implicit human biases that have rendered the labor market prone to discriminatory practices. We hope that this work can suggest ways that algorithmic fairness interventions can shi these hiring strategies towards contributing to a be er, fairer future.
While this paper has shown that imposing the TLM hiring constraint ultimately leads to a group-symmetric outcome, we do not claim that ours is the only intervention able to produce such an equilibrium. e labor market pipeline in reality is an elaborate sequence of agent choices and social stages that is much more complex and heterogeneous than our model's pre-TLM, TLM, and PLM periods.
e true space of possible policy interventions dwarfs those considered in this work. Interventions aimed at reducing the economic inequalities that exist between black and white communities have been implemented at a variety of junctures in the standard social pipeline, ranging from direct governmental subsidy programs for childhood education costs in high-poverty areas to private companies' a empts at diversifying hiring by partnering with historically black colleges. As such, there may exist a multiplicity of intervention-types that all ultimately lead to group-egalitarian outcomes. Further analysis of the costs and e ciencies associated with each of these regimes will produce a richer understanding of potential fairness interventions and their concomitant welfare e ects. Insofar as work in labor market fairness ought to inspire action and policy in the real world, these open questions will require both theoretical and empirical a ention.
APPENDIX 5.1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the rm-set reputation thresholdΠ t = p H − ∆ t enforces a worker strategy of e ort exertion akin to that of the one-shot game, in which a worker exerts high e ort if she can a ord to do so and low e ort otherwise. e rm, by se ing its reputation threshold ≈ p H , is correctly restricting its membership to workers who appear to be consistently exerting high e ort. By the Law of Large Numbers, a worker's individual reputation Π t i → p H almost surely as t → ∞ as long as she continuously exerts high e ort at each time step. Moreover, since the relationship between e ort exertion and G or B outcomes can considered Bernoulli trials with p = p H , we use the law of the iterated logarithm to bound individual good workers' reputational deviations away from the theoretical mean p H as t increases and have that for all t = t ,
Rubinstein and Yaari [? ] have shown that, for a similar set-up of imperfect observability and moral hazard in repeated interactions between insurers and clients, the enforceability of the insurers' strategies is dependent on the choice of the forgiveness bu er sequence. In our case, as long as ∆ t > t −1 (0.5log logt ) and the sequence ∆ t → 0 monotonically, the Rubinstein-Yaari result carries over into employment relationships, and workers will always exert high e ort when they can a ord to do so. Importantly, our scenario does di er from theirs in two ways: 1) Workers do not stay in the labor market for an in nite number of rounds, 2) A rm must pay the labor-market-wide wage upon hiring a worker and is not allowed to unilaterally deviate from this set price. Since workers exit the market according to a Poisson parameter λ and the wage premium w( t ) > 0 is set to always provide a higher payo for a worker than failing to be hired at all (due to the normalization with respect to the unskilled job wage), the memoryless death process ensures that a worker i with quali cations ρ will always nd it within her interest to pursue the skilled job as long as it is individually rational for her to do so, i.e. e ρ (θ i ) ≤ w( t −1 )(p H −p ρ ).
Proof of eorem 3.1 e TLM hiring constraint immediately e ects two fairnessrelated guarantees: 1) It retains the fundamental equality of the groups' ability level distributions F (θ ) throughout the labor market;
2) It results in statistical parity in the proportion of workers o ered skilled jobs in the TLM. erefore since the instantaneous time t contributions to groups' full population societal reputations π µ are threshold resulting from the investment threshold under statistical parity-constrained hiring: θ Q >θ .
When θ Q < θ B , then TLM group-blind hiring leaves behind high ability workers in group B who would have otherwise been hired in the PLM. In particular, all quali ed workers in group B with ability level θ ∈ [ θ Q , θ B ) are only hired in the fairness constrained equilibrium; under group-blind hiring, they are barred from entering the TLM. is result accords with the vicious circle of the asymmetric equilibrium, since the reputation gap |π B t − π W t | and consequently, di erences in group investment costs are maintained.
Further, since 1 − F ( θ ρ ) < 1 − F f ( θ ρ ) where F and F f are the ability CDFs under the group-blind and fair regime respectively, in a labor market that demands more workers yet cannot sustain a higher wage (w = w) 8 , rms strictly prefer the steadystate equilibrium under the fairness constraint. is is because the e ective higher ability threshold for group B under the group-blind TLM strategy is ine cient, leaving behind an untapped resource of skilled and quali ed individuals in group B who would have otherwise been hired in the PLM. Even those workers in group W with ability level θ ∈ [ θ W , θ Q ) who are only allowed to enter the TLM in the group-blind regime do not fare be er, since all such workers have ability level lower than the PLM reputation threshold and are not hired at equilibrium anyway. us since some workers in group B are strictly be er o and workers in group W no worse o under these labor market conditions, the asymmetric equilibria arising under group-blind hiring is Pareto-dominated by the symmetric equilibrium of the fairness constraint case. e proof of this result for the statistical discriminatory hiring regime follows similarly. If ξ W > ξ B , then P(Q |W , η) > P(Q |B, η), and the groups face di erent incentive compatibility constraints. Self-con rming asymmetric equilibria also exist under this regime [21] , and using the same argument about lost e ciency due to inequitable ability thresholds in the TLM for group B, these equilibria are also Pareto-dominated by hiring that abides by statistical parity.
